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ABSTRACT
As deep neural networks (DNNs) become widely used, pruned and quantised models are becoming ubiquitous on
edge devices; such compressed DNNs are popular for lowering computational requirements. Meanwhile, recent
studies show that adversarial samples can be effective at making DNNs misclassify. We, therefore, investigate
the extent to which adversarial samples are transferable between uncompressed and compressed DNNs. We find
that adversarial samples remain transferable for both pruned and quantised models. For pruning, the adversarial
samples generated from heavily pruned models remain effective on uncompressed models. For quantisation, we
find the transferability of adversarial samples is highly sensitive to integer precision.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) perform well on a wide
range of tasks, including image classification (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012), object detection (Ren et al., 2015), reading
comprehension (Seo et al., 2016) and machine translation
(Bahdanau et al., 2015). They have proved to be an efficient
method of harvesting information from large amounts of
data and are expected to be ubiquitous in the future. Despite
these successes, two questions remain crucial for deploying
them in embedded systems. First, their substantial compu-
tational and memory requirements can make deployment
challenging on power-limited devices. Second, as they start
to appear in safety-critical applications, their reliability and
security become a serious issue.
In order to compute DNNs efficiently on embedded systems,
researchers have proposed various compression methods.
The research has two main branches: 1) efforts to reduce
their computation requirements; and 2) efforts to imple-
ment custom accelerators. Pruning directly reduces the
number of parameters of DNNs – this reduction translates
to fewer data movements and thus saves energy directly.
Quantisation is another popular compression technique – it
simultaneously reduces the memory footprint and decreases
the energy cost of multiplications. Both compression meth-
ods are widely deployed on DNN accelerators. For instance,
Efficient Inference Engines (EIE) use pruning, quantisation
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and encoding techniques for energy efficiency (Han et al.,
2016a); the Sparse CNN (SCNN) accelerator first requires
network parameters to be pruned and encoded, then per-
forms computations directly using the encoded data format
(Parashar et al., 2017). It seems certain that pruning, quanti-
sation and other compression techniques will be essential
for future DNN accelerators on embedded devices.
In the meantime, adversarial machine learning research has
found DNNs to be sensitive to small perturbations of the
input images, with the result that they can often be fooled
easily using specially-crafted adversarial inputs (Szegedy
et al., 2013). Such adversarial samples could become real
threats in safety-critical systems; attackers might try to ma-
nipulate autonomous vehicles (Eykholt et al., 2018) or break
into smart phones by tricking the speaker recognition system
(Carlini et al., 2016).
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the portability
of adversarial samples. Might an attacker learn how to
break into widely-deployed low-security systems and then
use the adversarial samples as a springboard to attack other
systems?
We make the following contributions in this paper.
• We investigated the effects of different DNN compres-
sion mechanisms on adversarial attacks.
• We have developed the first compression-aware ma-
chine learning attack taxonomy and used it to evaluate
the transferability of adversarial samples between com-
pressed and uncompressed models.
• In pruning, we found that adversarial samples are trans-
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ferable between compressed and uncompressed mod-
els. However, adversarial samples generated from un-
compressed models are less effective on compressed
models in fast-gradient-based attacks.
• In quantisation, we found that adversarial samples are
transferable between compressed and uncompressed
models. However, a reduction in integer precision
provides clipping effects and marginally limits trans-
ferability in fast-gradient-based attacks.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Pruning
Pruning directly reduces the number of parameters in a
DNN model, and thus the number of off-chip to on-chip
data transfers on modern DNN accelerators (Chen et al.,
2016). If the architecture allows, pruning may also reduce
the computation cost (Kim et al., 2018). Consider a weight
tensor (Wn); fine-grained pruning is simply performing an
element-wise multiplication () between a mask operator
Mn and the original weight tensor (Wn).
Wn
′ =Wn Mn (1)
Han et al. first proposed pruning a DNN by applying a
threshold to the DNN’s parameters (Han et al., 2016b). In
this case, the mask (Mn) consists of thresholding by a single
value α.
Mn = hk(Wn
(i,j)) =
{
0 if α > |Wk(i,j)|
1 otherwise
(2)
Using this simple one-shot pruning technique, Han et al.
were able to reduce the number of parameters in AlexNet by
9x and VGG16 by 13x (Han et al., 2016b). In their imple-
mentation, the masking and fine-tuning happens iteratively
but the masked values are not allowed to recover in later
stages.
Guo et al. subsequently proposed dynamic network surgery
(DNS), which allows pruned parameters to recover at later
stages(Guo et al., 2016). The approach is to condition the
mask using the following equation, where α and β are two
constants.
Mn = hk(Wn
(i,j)) =

0 if α > |Wk(i,j)|
Mn
(i,j) if α ≤ |Wk(i,j)| ≤ β
1 otherwise
(3)
Values that become bigger at later stages are allowed to re-
join the fine-tuning process. Guo et al. demonstrated higher
compression rates on a large range of networks compared
to Han et al. In this paper, we generate pruned DNNs using
the DNS method.
2.2 Quantisation
Quantisation refers to using fewer number of bits than a 32-
bit single-precision floating-point representation for param-
eters in a DNN. Single-precision floating point numbers are
widely used on modern CPUs and GPUs, however, Hubara
et al. presented that low-precision fixed-point numbers can
be used for neural network inference with nearly no loss
of accuracy (Hubara et al., 2017). In the extreme case, the
parameters of a DNN can be quantised to either binary val-
ues (Courbariaux et al., 2016) or ternary values (Li et al.,
2016). Aggressive quantisation methods, such as binarisa-
tion and ternarisation, bring large benefits to potential DNN
hardware accelerators but suffer from a significant loss of
accuracy. For resource-constrained devices, using a low-
precision fixed-point representation reaches a balance be-
tween model accuracy and hardware performance (Lin et al.,
2016). The narrower bitwidth means direct reductions in
memory requirement and fixed-point multiplications are less
computationally expensive compared to single-precision
floating point. In this paper, we generate models that use
fixed-point parameters at various levels of precision.
2.3 Adversarial Attacks
Szegedy et al. (Szegedy et al., 2013) discovered that models
trained on huge datasets, despite generalising well, are all
vulnerable to adversarial samples. Misclassification can
happen with certain imperceptible perturbations on the data
samples. Interestingly, all the samples they used were within
the expected data distribution and only a small specifically-
crafted amount of noise was added. They observed that mod-
els of different configurations, trained on different datasets,
misclassify the same samples. Finally, they noted that train-
ing a model on adversarial samples helps make it more
robust against them. However, this defence is not always
practical; their approach based on L-BFGS requires an ex-
pensive constrained optimisation which iterates many times.
A follow-up paper by Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) explored the underlying reasons for the existence
and generalisability of adversarial samples. They argue
that such samples are an artefact of high-dimensional dot-
products, and attacks are generalisable because different
models learn similar functions when trained to perform the
same task. Additionally, they presented two methods to
generate adversarial samples in a white-box setting, the fast
gradient method (FGM) and the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM). Finally, they discovered that RBF-based networks
are much more resistant to adversarial samples.
Papernot et al. (Papernot et al., 2016b) came up with an-
Understanding the Interactions between Adversarial Attacks and Neural Network Compression
other way to generate adversarial samples. They use the
gradients of a network to construct saliency maps for the
input to discover which input values are so sensitive that
a change can drive an misclassification. They showed that
their method has the flexibility of being used in both super-
vised and unsupervised settings and is capable of generating
samples with a user given priority on particular properties
of the inputs. Finally, they also observed that adversarial
attacks become harder when models have been trained with
adversarial samples.
There is now a growing corpus of research on the transfer-
ability of adversarial samples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Good-
fellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016a; Trame`r et al.,
2017). Transferability refers to the ability of an adversarial
sample to evade the correct classification on two different
classifiers trained to perform the same task.
Goodfellow et al.(Goodfellow et al., 2015) and Warde-
Farley & Goodfellow(Warde-Farley & Goodfellow, 2016)
empirically found that adversarial examples usually occur
in large, continuous spatial regions. Tramer et al.(Trame`r
et al., 2017) found out that each of the models differs in the
dimensionality of its subspaces. A higher number of dimen-
sions increases the chance that the subspaces of different
models intersect, leading to transferable samples.
Transferable adversarial are a real hazard for model deploy-
ment, as attacks developed on a particular type of classifier
anywhere can potentially by deployed everywhere. Papernot
et al. (Papernot et al., 2017) have shown that an adversary
can successfully perform attacks without any knowledge of
a model’s internal parameters – it is often enough to approx-
imate a model with another known model against which one
can build adversarial samples.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Attack Taxonomy
In this paper, we are interested in the interaction between
adversarial attacks and model compression, and we inves-
tigate three specific attack scenarios. We use the name
baseline model (i.e. model without any compression) for
a pretrained network that is dense and whose parameters
are represented using full-precision (float32) values. We
then use the name compressed models to denote models that
have been compressed using pruning or quantisation.
• Scenario 1: Adversarial attacks occur on each individ-
ual compressed model, with the adversarial examples
generated and applied on the same model.
• Scenario 2: Adversarial samples are generated from
the baseline model but applied on each compressed
model.
• Scenario 3: Adversarial samples are generated from
compressed models but applied on the baseline model.
In the first scenario, adversarial samples are generated from
each compressed model. Attackers can access these com-
pressed models fully, and generate adversarial samples for
each one individually. This is the case where attackers buy
products and figure out how to attack them.
The second scenario makes the assumption that attackers
can only access the baseline model to generate adversarial
samples, which are then used to attack various compressed
models. Attackers are not allowed to fetch any gradients
from compressed models. This is the case where firms take
publicly-available models and compress them to run more
efficiently on edge devices. Attackers can easily find the
same public model and craft adversarial samples to attack
proprietary edge devices.
The third scenario assumes that only compressed models
are visible to attackers, and attackers generate adversarial
samples using compressed models to attack the hidden base-
line model. In practice, companies now deploy various
compressed neural network models on edge devices that
are exposed to end-users. The assumption is the attackers
have the ability to access these compressed models on the
edge and create adversarial samples from them to attack
the hidden baseline model. This then leads to the second
scenario; the attacker’s knowledge and toolkit can be gener-
alised to other products from the same firm. Figure 1 shows
the second and third attack scenarios.
For example, modern anti-virus (AV) software uses DNNs
to detect malware behaviour. Some AV modules detect such
behaviours in offline mode. When deploying a compressed
model in such an application, how likely is it that malware
could analyse the compressed model and use this to evade
the full model, and thus the firm’s other AV products? Sim-
ilarly, if an alarm company deploys a compressed model
for intruder detection in CCTV equipment, could an intelli-
gence agency that buys such equipment figure out how to
defeat not just that product but all the products derived from
the same full model? And just as a new type of software at-
tack such as Heartbleed or Meltdown can cause widespread
disruption by requiring thousands of disparate systems to be
patched, so portable adverse examples could force upgrades
to large numbers of diverse embedded systems.
3.2 Networks and Compression Methods
We use LeNet5 (LeCun et al., 2015) and CifarNet (Zhao
et al., 2018) for our experiments on MNIST (LeCun et al.,
2010) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2014) datasets. The
LeNet5 model has 431K parameters and classifies MNIST
digits with an accuracy of 99.36%. The CifarNet classi-
fier (Zhao et al., 2018) has 1.3M parameters and achieves
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Figure 1. Two different attack setups. Attackers only generate adversarial samples based on baseline model (left), or attackers generate
adversarial samples based on compressed models (right).
85.93% classification accuracy.
In terms of compression methods, we implemented the fol-
lowing:
• Fine-grained pruning on weights.
• Fixed-point quantisation on both weights and activa-
tions.
We used the Mayo tool to generate pruned and quantised
models (Zhao et al., 2018), and fine-tuned these models
after pruning and quantisation. For each pruning density or
quantised bitwidth, we retrain 350 epochs for LeNet5 and
300 epochs for CifarNet with three scheduled learning rate
decays starting from 0.01. For each decay, the learning rate
decreases by a factor of 10.
Applying pruning on a pretrained model shrinks the number
of parameters and thus the memory footprint of future AI
ASICs. We use fixed-point quantisation on both weights
and activations of a DNN. Quantising both weights and acti-
vations means that computations operate in low-precision
fixed-point formats, which cut the time and energy cost
both data moves and computations. For fixed-point quan-
tisation, we use a 1-bit integer when bitwidth is 4, a 2-bit
integer when bitwidth is 8, and the rest of the fixed-point
quantisations all have 4-bit integers.
3.3 Adversarial attacks
In the work reported in this paper we used three popular
attacks developed in the research community. What follows
are mathematical definitions of the attacks and comments
about their behaviour.
Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow et al., 2015) first intro-
duce the fast gradient method (FGM) and fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) to develop attacks. For the definitions we
will use the following notation: θ represents the param-
eters of the model, X represents the inputs, while y and
yl represents the outputs and labels respectively. We can
then use J(θ, X , yl) to represent the cost function. The
original FGM and FGSM perturbations are computed as
shown in Equation (4) and Equation (5) respectively, where
 is a hyperparameter and the function ∇X() computes the
first-order derivative with respect to input X .
η = (∇XJ(θ,X, y)) (4)
η = sign(∇XJ(θ,X, y)) (5)
Kurakin et al. presented an iterative algorithm based on
FGM and FGSM methods. In Algorithm 1, we present an
iterative FGSM (IFGSM), where the adversarial samples
Xadvn are generated for the nth iteration.
During each iteration, the intermediate results get clipped
to make sure that the resulting adversarial images lie within
an  interval from the previous iteration.
Algorithm 1 IFGSM
Input: data Xin
Initialize Xadv0 = Xin.
for n = 0 tom− 1 do
N = sign(∇XJ(θ,Xadvn , yl))}
Xadvn+1 = ClipX,{Xadvn +N}
end for
Kurakin et al. also presented an iterative version of FGM
where instead of just using the sign to determine the di-
rection of a gradient, the gradient amplitudes contribute
to the corresponding gradient update step. The iterative
FGM (IFGM) is nearly identical to the IFGSM with a small
change ofN = ∇XJ(θ,Xadvn , yl).
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Figure 2. Transferability properties for pruning. The green, red and cyan lines represent the first, second and third attack scenarios
respectively. The blue line show the accuracies of pruned models without any attacks.
Moosavi et al. (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) featured
another attack called ‘Deepfool’, which is also based on
iterative gradient adjustment. However, Deepfool is differ-
ent from IFGSM in that it does not scale and clip gradients.
It is based on the idea that the separating hyperplanes in
linear classifiers indicate the decision boundaries of differ-
ent classes. It therefore iteratively perturbs an imageXadv0 ,
linearises the classification space aroundXadvn and moves
towards the closest decision boundary. The step is chosen
according to the l0, l1 or even the lp norm of Xadvn to the
last-found decision boundary. The applied step is then used
asXadvn+1.
In practice Deepfool is found to produce smaller pertur-
bations than the original IFGSM, which makes it a more
precise attack (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). In this paper
we used an L2 norm-based version of Deepfool – the attack
stops accumulate perturbations after it successfully crosses
the closest decision boundary.
It should be noted that in this particular paper we were not in-
terested in the absolute accuracy but the relative behaviours
with a set of fixed parameters for adversarial attacks. We
chose the strongest white box adversary model and picked
three of the strongest iterative attacks. For all the experi-
ments, we did not sweep all the possible hyper-parameters
for the adversarial attacks, but picked empirically sensible
hyper-parameters. We used an  of 0.02 and performed the
attacks for 12 epochs. For both IFGM and IFGSM we used
Clip with a minimum value of 0 and maximum value of 1.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Pruning
Goodfellow et al. explained the existence of adversarial
samples as follows (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Consider
an adversarial sample as the original input x with an addi-
tional noise η. When passing through multiple layers of
matrix multiplication, this small noise eventually grows to a
large enough value to shift the decision of the whole model.
Given weights w of a particular layer of a neural network
and adversarial sample x˜ = x + η, the output of that par-
ticular layer is wT x˜ = wTx+wTη, and the adversarial
perturbation causes the the output activations to grow by
wTη.
Figure 2 shows the performance of IFGSM, IFGM and
DeepFool on pruned models under three different attack
scenarios. The horizontal axis shows the densities of DNNs,
effectively the ratio of the number of non-zero values to
the total number of values. The vertical axis presents test
accuracies of DNNs. Apart from showing the accuracies
of pruned networks without any attacks (BASE ACC), we
present the accuracies of the pruned models with three dif-
ferent attack scenarios. The first scenario corresponds to
COMP→ COMP, the second scenario and third scenario
corresponds to FULL→ COMP and COMP→ FULL re-
spectively.
The first thing to become apparent is that samples gener-
ated from the compressed models are transferable to the
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Figure 3. Lenet5 accuracy with IFGSM and IFGM-generated adversarial samples with different epsilon values and number of epochs
baseline model. This finding reinforces the idea that the ad-
versarial samples are not scattered randomly but are reside
in large and contiguous high-dimensional spaces, enabling
them to survive the effect of pruning. In the cases of both
IFGSM and IFGM, transferability becomes worse when the
adversarial samples are generated at smaller densities. Af-
ter exploring the performance of these attacks, we find the
adversarial samples generated by IFGSM on networks with
smaller densities are smaller both in terms of pixel changes
and the perturbation amplitude.
We suggest that pruning smooths the decision space by re-
moving DNN weights that have little impact. This ultimately
has an effect on IFGSM – with unimportant parts removed,
the gradients now follow the path towards the most impor-
tant and prominent parts of the space. As a result, relatively
small perturbations based on compressed models generalise
very well on the uncompressed model.
Unlike scenario 2, in scenario 1 and 3 both IFGSM and
IFGM seem to become less effective as the density de-
creases, but probably for different reasons.
In scenario 1 – one compressed model attacking another –
the decrease in attack efficacy should be attributed to the
fact that the previously-used step  was no longer large
enough to reach a successful decision boundary along the
gradients. Figure 3 shows that small  values are not efficient
for attacking pruned models. On both IFGM and IFGSM,
we notice an increase in accuracy when the  values are
small. Also, IFGSM shows a better attacking performance
but suffers more from the effect of small  values. Such
behaviour in case of IFGM and IFGSM can be explained by
the use of the Clip function. The use of  and Clip function
was originally designed to make sure that the changes of the
original images are not too large, and apparently the attacks
require a large  to remain effective on pruned models.
In scenario 2 – using an uncompressed model to attack a
compressed one – we attribute this behaviour to the mas-
sively regularized space. The adversarial samples are in-
fluenced by the local minima of the baseline model. Since
pruning serves as a regularization method and removes local
minima in the optimization space, the adversarial samples
generated from pruned models have better transferability to
uncompressed models.
Deepfool shows a similar behaviour to IFGSM and IFGM at
high densities, in that a full model attacking a compressed
one achieves similar accuracy to the other way around.
However, unlike the behaviour we saw before, Deepfool
increases its efficiency when the pruning density decreases.
We hypothesize that unlike FGM implementation, Deepfool
does not use the Clip function, and counteracts the move-
ment of the decision boundary by increasing the amplitude
of the gradient effect.
Summary
1. For IFGM and IFGSM, the transferability of adversar-
ial samples between pruned and full models is affected
by the reduction of density.
• It becomes easier to attack the baseline model
using a compressed model when densities are low.
• It becomes harder to attack the compressed model
using a baseline model when densities are low.
2. For scenarios 1 and 3, a more fine-grained attack
method (DeepFool) performs better as the network
densities decrease.
3. For scenarios 1 and 3, clipped attacking methods
(IFGSM and IFGM) perform worse as the network
densities decrease.
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Figure 4. Transferability properties for quantising both weights and activations. The green, red and cyan lines represent the first, second
and third attack scenarios respectively. The blue line show the accuracies of quantised models without any attacks.
4.2 Fixed-point Quantisation
Fixed-point quantisation refers to quantising both weights
and activations to fixed-point numbers for a neural network
to perform inference using low-cost fixed-point multiplica-
tions. Figure 4 shows the performance of adversarial attacks
on quantised models under three different attack scenarios
In general, the performance of attacks stays nearly constant
at bitwidths that are higher than 8. When using fewer bits
on both weights and activations, the model shows a defen-
sive behaviour mainly because of the reduction in integer
precision.
Intuitively, we have two effects when values are quantised
to smaller bitwidths. First, a smaller bitwidth might indicate
less fractional bits. The reduction in fraction bits causes a
loss in precision, and more zeros are generated because of
the limited numerical representations. The generation of
zeros implies that the reduction in fractional bits introduces
the same effect as pruning. Second, a smaller bitwidth might
hint fewer integer bits, implying that weight and activation
values are capped to smaller values. Combining these two
effects, to give an example in our setup, models in 4-bit
fixed-point quantisation have smaller weight and activation
values and contain more zeros compared to models at higher
precisions. In Figure 5.a, we show the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) of CifarNet with different fixed-point
quantisations. There are clearly more zeros in the 4-bit Ci-
farNet – its cumulative density reaches around 0.9 when
value is at 0. The clipping effect is also more obvious on the
4-bit model, since it only has 1-bit integer, we can see the
4-bit model has its weights CDF reach 1.0 before all other
bitwidths in Figure 5.a.
Using the adversarial examples generated by compressed
models to attack the baseline model (Scenario 1), we ob-
serve both IFGM and IFGSM methods become less effec-
tive on LeNet5 and CifarNet. The same phenomenon occurs
when we use adversarial samples generated by the baseline
model to attack quantised models (Scenario 2). We suggest
that during quantisation, reducing fractional bits will not
hugely impact the attacks’ performance at high bitwidths,
but introduces a similar effect to pruning at low bitwidths.
In addition, reducing integer bits essentially introduces large
differences between the baseline model and the quantised
ones for adversarial attacks.
By reducing the length of the fraction, the rounding process
of fixed-point quantisation becomes more lossy. Uniformly
adding quantisation noise to each individual weight does
not affect attack performance. As we can see in Figure 4,
all three attack scenarios show a stable performance when
bitwidths are higher than 8, where the difference lies in the
length of the fraction. When the network gets quantised
down to 4 bits, quantisation behaves rather like pruning – a
large part of the network gets zeroed out.
In terms of reducing the integer bitwidth, we are clipping
the numerical values. Theoretically, clipping the values of
weights is different from clipping the values of activations.
For the former, we first consider how to create an adversar-
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(a) Weights (b) Activations
Figure 5. Cumulative distribution function (CDF) for all weights and activations in quantised CifarNet. Ten randomly chosen input images
from the validation dataset were used for generate CDF of activation values.
ial sample with minimal perturbation. An easy approach
is to focus on changing pixels that can perturb important
activations. Intuitively, the way to achieve such a perturba-
tion with minimal changes on the input image is to focus
on tweaking pixels with large weight values that are con-
nected to important activations. Thus a small change in
input image pixels can produce the maximal effect on acti-
vation values. When weights are clipped, adversarial attacks
see more weights with equal importance because they all
saturate to the same maximal value. This makes the attack
transferability between quantised models and baseline mod-
els challenging. For example, on a quantised network, an
adversarial example Xi considers wi = max(Wi) to be
the largest weight associated with the important activations
among all the weights (Wi) associated with activation ai.
This relationship wi = max(Wi) might break on the base-
line model and thus the adversarial sample becomes less
effective. In Figure 5, a 4-bit fixed-point quantisation clearly
shows a clipping effect on weight values, which contributes
to the marginal defensive nature we observed in Figure 4.
When activations are clipped to a smaller maximal value,
the transferability of adversarial attacks between quantised
and baseline models becomes worse. Figure 5.b shows how
activations are clipped to different maximum values when
using fixed-point quantisation. Adversarial attacks work
by adding artificial changes in input pixels to drive activa-
tions to unwanted states. Consider a simple case, where an
adversarial example overdrives one activation to be larger
than others in the same layer to cause a misclassification.
Clipping the activation values forces adversarial attacks to
find more fine-grained opportunities in terms of the rela-
tive importance between activations, which is significantly
harder.
Both clipping weights and clipping activations can signifi-
cantly affect the performance of attacks. As we can observe
that at smaller bit widths, all three scenarios show an in-
crease in accuracy when attacked by IFGM and IFGSM. In
terms of transferability, as shown in Figure 4, when applying
both the IFGSM and IFGM, adversarial examples remain
transferable between quantised and baseline models when
the fractional bits are lost. When the integer bits start to
decrease, we see the transferability of adversarial examples
become worse.
Figure 6. Mean perturbation amplitude per pixel for IFGSM.
Since saturation happens when the integer bitwidth is small,
a lot of originally big values are capped to a given range. In
other words, weights of a quantised DNN are clustered into
a smaller group of values that are closer together. A small
perturbation can now affect a large number of weights since
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many weights now have similar importance. Figure 6 shows
how adversarial samples generated from quantised DNNs
now require smaller perturbations to attack the baseline
model.
Surprisingly, we find that Deepfool, unlike IFGM, generates
samples that were transferable in scenarios 2 and 3 and
has shown relatively good attack performance for Lenet5 in
Scenario 2. We attribute this difference to the regularisation
benefit of quantisation. Regularization makes it easier to
generate adversarial samples for models that overfit. As
with pruning, quantisation smooths the decision space and
Deepfool’s use of unclipped gradient amplitudes allows it
to reach the decision boundary.
Although IFGSM show slightly higher accuracies at low
precision, this protective behavior in quantisation is only
marginal. In addition, the adversarial attacks still show good
performances in all three scenarios compared to both IFGM
and DeepFool if we consider the classification accuracies
(Figure 4).
Summary
1. The transferability of adversarial samples between
quantised and non-quantised models is not affected
by the reduction in fractional bitwidth at high preci-
sion.
2. Aggressive reductions in fractional bits introduce the
same effect as fine-grained pruning.
3. Smaller integer bit widths on weights and activations
make it marginally harder to attack the baseline model
using adversarial samples generated from compressed
models. This suggests that semantic class information
is contained in both activations and weights.
4. For transferability, in terms of values of classification
accuracies, we have observed the best performance
with IFGSM.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper reports an empirical study of the interaction be-
tween adversarial attacks and neural network compression.
Both quantisation and pruning sparsify the network, i.e.
introduce a greater number of zeros into the network. Sam-
ples generated from heavily pruned models work effectively
on the underlying baseline model. However, low-density
DNNs are somewhat defensive when attacked by adver-
sarial samples generated from the baseline model using
fast-gradient-based methods. Quantisation is different in
that adversarial samples from fast-gradient-based methods
become marginally harder to transfer when models are heav-
ily quantised. This defensive behaiour appears due to the
reduction in integer bits of both weights and activations
rather than to the truncation in fractional bits.
The broader implications are that attacks on DNN classifiers
that involve adversarial inputs may be surprisingly portable.
Even if a firm ships only a compressed version of its clas-
sifier in widely distributed products, such as IoT devices
or apps, attacks that people discover on these compressed
classifiers may translate fairly easily to attacks on the under-
lying baseline model, and thus to other compressed versions
of the same model. Just as software vulnerabilities such
as Heartbleed and Spectre required the patching of many
disparate systems, so also a new adversarial sample may de-
feat many classifiers of the same heritage. Firms should be
aware that while shipping a compressed classifier may give
real benefits in terms of performance, it may not provide
much in the way of additional safety or security.
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